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Abstract
Using a data set for 162 largest Hungarian firms during the period of 1994-1999 this
paper explores the determinants of equity shares held by both foreign investors and by
Hungarian corporations. We find evidence of a post-privatisation evolution towards more
homogeneus equity structures, where dominant categories of owners aim at achieving
controlling stakes. Here, the foreign investors and Hungarian corporations play the major
role. In addition, focusing on firm level characteristics we find that the exporting firms
attract foreign owners, who acquire controlling equity stakes. Similarly, the firm size
measurements are positively associated with the presence of foreign investors. However,
they are negatively associated with 100% foreign ownership, possibly because the
marginal costs of acquiring additional equity are growing with the size of the assets. We
interpret the results in light of the existing theory. In particular, following Demsetz and
Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) we argue that equity should not be
treated as an exogenous variable. As for specific determinants of equity levels, we focus
on informational asymmetries and (unobserved) ownership specific characteristics of
foreign investors and Hungarian investors.
1. Introduction: endogenous equity
Much of the existing literature takes ownership variables as given, i.e. considers
them exogenous. This approach has been typical for most of research on privatisation
outcomes in the former state-owned enterprises in central and eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union (FSU). Thus, in the economics of transition research, arguments
based on agency theory within a partial equilibrium framework have played by far the
predominant role, with the development and testing of models describing the impact of
the newly created structures of corporate governance on firm performance using large
samples and statistical methods. A major theme of this research is that ownership change
would create new incentives or impose new control structures upon managers of the
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2former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) therefore forcing them to engage in restructuring
strategies aimed at efficiency improvement (Boycko et al., 1995). A most important
research issue is the question how newly privatised companies respond to internal and
external factors causing organisational restructuring.
However, different theoretical models and empirical studies have provided
different and conflicting answers to this question (see, Megginson and Netter 2001,
Djankov and Murrell 2000, Havrylyshyn and McGettigan 2000, Bonin 1998 for a
discussion). In particular, there is a disagreement about the effects of new ownership
structures on the extent and speed of enterprise restructuring. For example, managerial
ownership has been found to have both positive (e.g., Aukutsionek et al., 1998;
Filatotchev et al., 2000) and negative (e.g., Aghion & Blanchard, 1998; Blasi et al., 1997)
effects on the likelihood of restructuring actions. Similarly, existing research on post-
privatisation restructuring has identified ambiguity in the role of outside ownership.
Outside investors have been found to have both positive (e.g., Pohl et al., 1997) and
neutral (e.g., Aukutsionek et al., 1998) effects on the extent of restructuring and
performance. Case-study evidence from large firms in the Slovak Republic presented by
Djankov & Pohl (1998) indicated that rapid consolidation of outside ownership promoted
enterprise restructuring after the initial privatisation stage. Carlin & Aghion (1996)
argued that privatisation boosted ‘reactive’ restructuring, using evidence from both
Russia and Hungary, yet  foreign ownership was required for ‘deep’ restructuring.
However, a number of other publications have provided more ambiguous results. For
example, using frontier production function estimation technique, Brada et al. (1997) did
not find any links between privatisation and improvements in enterprise efficiency, using
data from industrial firms in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Frydman et al. (1997)
concluded that product restructuring was not affected by differences in ownership
structure using survey data from mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Poland and
Hungary. A number of studies of ownership effects on firm restructuring and performance
in the FSU provide similar results: differences in ownership structure and corporate
governance variables, such as board composition were not consistently related to the
extent and speed of strategic changes at  the firm level in Russia (Blasi et al., 1997; Earle,
1998; Filatotchev et al., 1996), and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (Estrin, et al., 1998;
Filatotchev et al., 2000).
3The ambiguity of results may indicate that the underlying theoretical assumptions
are not entirely satisfactory. Some authors strongly point out that in economies in
transition, privatisation seems to set in motion a process of ownership adjustment where
ownership concentration and structure may be an outcome of various firm-specific factors
such as size, performance, industrial affiliation, etc., as well as the firm’s operating
environment (see Filatotchev et al., 2001a; Filatotchev and Mickiewicz, 2001). This
dissenting strand in literature draws from Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Jensen and
Warner (1988), who provided both arguments and evidence for treating equity
composition as endogenous. This has been recently reinforced by Demsetz and Villalonga
(2001), who offer both the review of discussion and econometric evidence showing that
the equity structure is determined by past performance and firm level characteristics.
Diversity in equity structures may be considered as the equilibrium result, where different
ownership structures are optimal for different categories of firms. In addition, the
response of equity structures to firm-level characteristics is also affected by the
characteristics of the capital market framework. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et
al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b), Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) provide both
the theoretical models and empirical evidence that suggests that concentrated ownership
and equity levels that guarantee control rights are an equilibrium response to imperfect
capital markets. Yet, not many studies on post-privatisation outcomes in transition
economies consider equity as endogenous. In a rare longitudinal study of 150 privatised
companies in Russia, Aukutsionek et al. (1998) identified a selection bias when outside
investors bought into relatively successful companies, which confirms that cross-sectional
studies of privatisation effects on restructuring and performance are questionable from the
theoretical and empirical points of view.
The purpose of this article is to investigate if the assumption of endogenous equity
and control structures may explain the post-privatisation ownership adjustment in one of
the most dynamic transition economies, Hungary. Certain aspects of the Hungarian
privatisation are unique to the region. The government has implemented “gradualist”
privatisation in contrast to mass ‘give away’ voucher schemes.1 The procedure was a
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inflationary impact via the wealth effect.
4slow, case by case sale process. Yet, unlike ‘mass privatisation’ and other forms of ‘non-
equivalent’ privatisation, the proceeds were used to improve the budget position and
decrease the country’s debt burden. Furthermore, this form of privatisation attracted
foreign investors - indeed, Hungary is now one of the major destinations in the region for
an inflow of capital. In fact, the level of privatisation revenues per capita and FDI inflow
are strongly correlated as demonstrated by EBRD (2000). Hungary is  a transition
economy characterised by both the highest privatisation revenues and inflow of FDI per
capita.2
In this paper, using a data set for 162 largest firms (1994-1999), we show that the
equity structures converge towards high homogeneity. Equity stakes held by foreign and
Hungarian corporations are significantly related to factors such as the firm’s size, export
orientation, past performance and industry affiliation. 
The paper is organised as follows. The following section provide a theory review
that discusses possible determinants of equity structure, and develop a number of
hypotheses. Next, we offer an empirical account of the evolution of ownership structures
towards higher homogeneity. Subsequent sections present methodology and econometric
results for the determinants of equity levels. Last section concludes.
2. Factors affecting equity composition
As already discussed, a number of authors have suggested that firm characteristics
may determine its ownership structure. The relevant indicators include size, investment
needs, industry, location, export potential, etc. In other words, a firm’s ownership
structure is an equilibrium response to an individual firm’s operating characteristics and
its competitive environment (Short, 1994), and the direction of causality between
ownership and firm characteristics is not entirely resolved by papers using cross-sectional
variations in ownership. In particular, Dyck (2000) suggests that the lack of promising
investment projects is perhaps a greater problem in developing and transition economies
than differences in ownership structures. Firms with attractive investment opportunities
may have issued new equity whereas firms with unattractive investment opportunities
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5may have had no need to do so. Thus, resulting equity structure is implied by the
investment opportunity, not vice versa.
A fast growing literature on optimal ownership structures of firms depending on the
levels of ‘private benefits of control’ (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv,
1988) has also extended research beyond the conventional US/UK environment and has
recently become a focal point of theoretical and policy debates. This research is
particularly important for countries with relatively low protection of minority investors and
where expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders is extensive.
However, the willingness of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors is
constrained by their financial incentives. Following the agency framework developed by
Jensen and Meckling (1976) a number of authors link these incentives with equity
ownership by controlling shareholders which enhances their interest in a non-distortionary
distribution of dividends. Other things equal, ownership concentration should lead to lower
expropriation, and, as a result, countries with poor investor protection would typically
exhibit more concentrated control of firms than do countries with good investor protection
(La Porta et al., 2000). Dyck (2000) suggests that dispersed ownership structures in
transition economies are unstable and relatively costly, and provides evidence that countries
that had dispersed ownership at the time of privatisation, such as the Czech Republic, report
steady increases in concentration over time. This evidence is consistent with the
assumption that concentration may be a substitute for legal protections in providing the
functions of corporate governance (La Porta et al., 1998), and, therefore, is an endogenous
factor.
The International Business research has also generally acknowledged an
endogeneity of ownership structures when considering factors affecting equity investment
by foreign firms in domestic companies. This research is focused on the competitive
advantage of the investing firm, relative to other firms located in the host country. In
addition, as markets have become more liberalised there is a growing need for firms to
engage in FDI in order to protect their existing or specific advantages, or to acquire new
dynamic ownership advantages. Building on a resource based view of the firm, Dunning
(2000) examines the firm’s internal capabilities and resources in terms of their ability to
maintain and upgrade these advantages, and their ability to locate their value added
activities in countries, which allow them to create and acquire new specific advantages
(see Kogut and Chang, 1991).
6In addition, the internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976) suggests that
the “greater the net benefits of internalising cross border intermediate product markets,
the more likely a firm will prefer to engage in foreign production itself,” (p164). Dunning
recommends a reassessment of the static organisational theory and an integration of the
transaction based and innovation based theories of the firm. In line with this, Ethier and
Markusen (1996) argue that new trade theory does not consider internalisation and the
enforcement of contracts or the fact that multinational enterprises are often linked to
knowledge based capital, which can be easily transported to other locations, at little cost
relative to physical capital. In addition the same authors adopt a model which employs the
association between foreign direct investment and the high tech sector, along with a
factor for choice of how the firm services a foreign market, which considers exporting,
licensing and establishing a subsidiary. This allows them to present the international
equilibrium, which determines both the pattern of specialisation and the market mode.
One of their important findings is that the desire to protect knowledge-based capital may
promote direct investment, as opposed to licensing. Moreover, this issue is most critical
not just in the high tech sector, but specifically in relation to firms, which may create
competition to the investing companies in the international markets, e.g., local firms with
significant export potential. Therefore, in the longer term, the transfer of knowledge
without ownership may result in enhanced competition against investors. High transaction
costs of the arm’s length technology transfer lead to direct investment rather than
subcontracting (Buckley and Casson 1998). Additionally, transaction costs may be higher
and the protection of intellectual property via contracts can be relatively more difficult in
a transition country, where the legal framework is still undergoing a process of reform
and reinforcement.
This argument is consistent with a view, which may be attributed as early as
Penrose (1956), which highlights that foreign investment is likely to flow to those
“newer, …faster growing and more profitable industries,” (p.216).  Dunning and Lundan
(1998) use and extend the Porter diamond (1990) and their study of 145 largest industrial
corporations show that FDI is flowing to knowledge intensive and high tech sectors.
Similarly, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find that in Sweden FDI is attracted to the
engineering, chemicals and pharmaceutical industries, and is under represented in the
paper and pulp sectors.
7A different strand of literature points out informational asymmetries as an
important factor, which affects the structure of foreign investment. In particular, Kang
and Stulz (1997) examine the home equity bias in Japan. By using the Merton (1987)
hypothesis , they show that investors invest in securities they know about. Kang and Stulz
find a positive relation between foreign ownership and exporting by local firms.
Similarly, in a recent study of foreign ownership in Sweden, Dahlquist and Robertsson
(2001) find that foreign investors are drawn towards those firms with a presence in
international markets. As heavy exporters are usually known abroad, export intensity can
be a proxy for this international profile factor. In the transition context, Lankes and
Venables (1997) found that from their survey of emerging economies, 71% of foreign
investors claimed that the main function of FDI was to export from the region. Mihalyi
(2000) makes a similar assumption in his study of FDI in Hungary: foreign strategic
investors assist the growth of exports, which induces macroeconomic stability. More
generally, Mihalyi stresses the importance of the integration of enterprises into a network
of TNC’s (transnational corporations).
Informational asymmetries may explain not only why exporting firms are typically
preferred by foreign investors, but also the preference for larger firms, as more
information is available on these firms. The bias towards larger firms is confirmed by
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001). Yet firm size may be a characteristic which attracts FDI
for several other reasons. For example, foreign equity holders may be attracted to larger
firms due to the advantages associated with economies of scale and scope. Kang and
Stulz (1997) find in the Japanese case of foreign ownership that foreign investors tend to
gravitate towards large firms. Those authors argue that size is a proxy for several positive
attributes: it can represent international standing, transparency and liquidity of shares, and
widespread ownership.
Performance is also expected to be a possible factor in determining the level of
foreign equity of a firm. The Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) study reveals that foreign
investors exhibit a preference for better performing firms, and their cross section and
pooled analyses show that firms with higher current ratios3 are associated with foreign
equity, as it reflects the firm’s ability to meet short term payment requirements. Also,
Kang and Stulz (1997) document that foreign investors hold disproportionately more
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8shares of firms with good accounting performance, measured by return on assets. Yet, the
attractiveness of returns is conditional on risk: Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001)
demonstrate that foreign investors show a weaker preference for risky firms with high
past returns than individual investors. Again, another important qualification relates to
general characteristics of the host countries. In the transition economy environment, the
financial performance measures may not provide good indicators for future results.
Moreover, they may be less significant for strategic investors, who dominate in such
environment.
3. Hypotheses
On the basis of existing research and characteristics of the institutional
framework, as discussed above, we derived the following set of hypotheses:
I. We shall expect that the equity structures evolve towards higher homogeneity,
with the dominant role of foreign direct investors.
II. a/ Foreign direct investment will be focused on companies where informational
asymmetry is relatively low. It implies that larger companies will have relatively
higher equity ownership by foreign investors.
 b/ On the other hand, size may prevent foreign investors from acquiring dominant
stakes.4
 We wish to test those two hypotheses separately – namely, for impact of size on
foreign investors presence and for impact of size on dominant stakes of foreign
investors.
III. Both presence and high equity stakes of foreign investors will be associated with
high export intensity. Conversely, the opposite is likely to be true for domestic
corporations.
 Two potential explanations relate to exports. On the basis of data set we
cannot distinguish between them. First focuses on the informational barriers –
exporting companies are more visible. This is the same theoretical argument,
which relates to size (Ia). Second argument is related to the assumption that the
foreign owners have specialised export-enhancing resources, which they want
both to protect and to acquire future gains from investment.
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9 Conversely, we expect that in case of domestic market oriented companies
(e.g., companies with a lower export intensity), 100% foreign ownership is less
likely, as foreign investors will seek access to specialised knowledge of Hungarian
corporations, creating links via joint equity.
IV. Foreign investors will acquire large equity stakes in companies characterised by a
high level of productivity in the past. Again, this may be linked to the
informational asymmetry problem. Unlike domestic investors, it is more difficult
for the foreign investors to assess net present value of the company on the basis of
more idiosyncratic information.
4. Adjustment towards homogeneous ownership structures
As acknowledged elsewhere, previous studies on corporate governance problems
in transitional and emerging economies experienced problems in obtaining representative
samples, accurate data and longitudinal information (Hoskisson et al., 2000). When
research was based on a firm-level data that has been obtained through questionnaire
surveys and interviews, the analysis suffered from a low level of data reliability and
ambiguity in measurements of various constructs (Estrin and Wright, 1999). To avoid
these problems, in our research we use the database of 162 largest Hungarian
manufacturing companies during the period of 1994-1999. The financial and economic
data corresponds to publicly available information, in particular to data published
annually in the Hungarian magazine “Figyelo”. The majority of firms in this sample
undergo a regular audit by foreign audit firms, and they publish annual reports that
provide key economic and financial indicators. In addition, this database was
supplemented by the records on equity holdings by different classes of owners, which was
collected as part of the ACE-Phare Project P-981048-R by the team at the Hungarian
Academy of Science co-ordinated by Peter Vince in early 2001.
To assess the direction of evolution in ownership structures, we computed time-
paths for two indicators:
- the unweighted (aritmetic) average share of foreign owners in firm’s equity:
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- the weighted average share of foreign owners in equity, which is equivalent to
the total share of foreign owners in aggregate value of equity (capital): 
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where n represents the total number of companies, ei relates to the total value of a
firm i equity, fi represents the value of equity held by foreign investors in a firm i, and w
is defined as: 
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In this study, we focus on internationalization by local firms rather than adopting
the more usual foreign firms’ perspective (see Filatotchev et al., 2001b, for an extensive
discussion of this issue). Therefore, we do not differentiate between different types of
foreign owners, such as, for example, financial institutions as opposed to industrial
partners/investors. However, the identity of the owners may have important corporate
governance effects (Filatotchev and Mickiewicz, 2001), and we intend to pursue this
avenue of research in the future.
Figures 1-4 presented in the Annex illustrate the evolution of the ownership
structure between 1994-1999, showing both shares of different categories of owners in
total capital of all companies and equally weighted average shares of different categories
of owners. Due to earlier privatisations, the share of state equity in largest Hungarian
firms decreased to about one third, already by 1994. The process of privatisation
continued during the next few years, and, as a result, the government share became
negligible by the end of 1990’s (Figure 4). For 1999, there is only one company in the
sample, which has not been privatised yet. In addition, there are just a few companies
with minority government stakes to be privatised later, and one company for which the
government retained ‘long-run’ minority equity holdings, implying that its equity is not
expected to be sold in a foreseeable future. State share in total capital was higher than the
average (equally weighted) share at the beginning of the period. It indicates that larger
companies were privatised slower than their smaller counterparts.
Foreign investors continued to be the main beneficiaries of the privatisation
process. An average share of foreign owners in equity was 56% already in 1994 (first of
the indicators, as defined above) and their share in total capital amounted to 44% (second
indicator). The difference between the two implies that foreign capital was initially
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flowing to small companies, which is simply a result of the initial privatisation choices.
Yet, as the privatisation process continued, the share of foreign equity in total capital
increased to 73% and the equally weighted average increased to 69%. Thus, the
equilibrium result for this class of owners indicates a preference for larger companies. It
is interesting to notice that the share of foreign investors stabilises after 1997, meaning
that foreign investors consolidate their holdings. The average share even decreases
marginally in 1999 (Figure 1). When the evolutions of foreign ownership and state
ownership during the period is taken together, it is reasonable to suggest that foreign
investors achieved their equilibrium level of equity holdings. This kind of adjustment
towards final equilibrium makes the period of 1994-1999 an interesting period to analyse.
The second important group of investors, who participated in the privatisation
process were Hungarian domestic enterprises. Their holdings are much lower than those
of foreign investors, however they visibly played a far more active role at later stage of
privatisation, as compared with the earlier period. This is confirmed by the fact that their
average holdings increases from 16.5% to 22.5% between 1994 and 1999. The share in
total capital increases as well, but at a less dramatic pace, from 11.5% to 13.0%. Again,
the difference between the two indicators results from higher shares of domestic
corporations in smaller companies. Overall, the significance of domestic corporations
(typically: relational investors) rose during that period (Figure 3).
Finally, one more interesting class of ownership is insider equity. As may be seen
from Figure 2, equity holdings of insiders in Hungary were very small, as opposed to
some other neighbouring economies, Poland in particular.5 Moreover, the average share
of insiders decreased significantly in the recent period, from 1.7%-1.8% in the period
1995-1997 to just above 1% in 1999. The share in total capital of all companies is even
lower and amounted to 0.6% in 1999. That indicates a stronger presence of insiders
equity in smaller companies.
The evolution of shares in total capital and average shares of equity for different
classes of owners suggest an interesting post-privatisation ownership dynamics that can
be identified at the disaggregated level. This is illustrated by Figures 5-8. First, Figure 5
presents a comparison of the distribution of foreign investors equity shares for 1994 and
1999. The structure in the latter year is far more dichotomous – firms with either 100% or
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zero foreign ownership dominate. How this evolved can be identified from the Figure 7,
which presents a scatter diagram comparing the foreign investors shares for 1994 and
1999 for the same companies. Points close to the diagonal represent companies, where
the share of foreign owners remained similar in this period. Few foreign firms decreased
their equity holdings, including four which withdrew completely (represented by points
on the horizontal axis). However, the increase in equity dominates, which is reflected by
the distribution on the scatter diagram skewed towards the upper left corner. It is
noticeable that in many firms where foreign investors had majority stakes already in
1994, they have also increased their holdings up to 100% in the subsequent period. In
addition, there were several new entries, as reflected by points on the vertical axis. Yet,
these firms were different in terms of initial equity levels acquired by foreign owners.
Similarly, we may illustrate an equity acquisition strategy by domestic
corporations as owners, using Figures 6 and 8. Here, the pattern of change is different, but
the trend towards more homogenous structures is also present. When 1994 is compared
with 1999 (Figure 6), the similar proportion (the majority of companies) have no
investment by Hungarian enterprises. However, for those, which have Hungarian
investors, the holdings by Hungarian corporations increase significantly. This is also
reflected by the 1994-1999 scatter diagram (Figure 8). However, it is also interesting to
notice that the group of companies with zero holdings by Hungarian corporations is not
the same in 1994 and 1999 – this is reflected in a significant number of points being
located on both horizontal and vertical axes. It is clear that Hungarian corporations were
more active in adjusting their investment structure, and the direction of adjustment differ
for various groups of firms. Again, the scatter diagram is skewed towards upper left
corner, which means that the increase in equity is more frequent, yet it is noticeable that a
number of other investors sold their holdings entirely, as represented by the points on the
horizontal axis. Thus, the general direction of change is consistent with the first group of
investors (foreign) –i.e. it reflects adjustment towards a more homogeneous structure of
ownership. Therefore an interesting research question remains: which factors affected the
levels of equity ownership chosen by the investors? 
5. Variables and estimation methods
As clear from the data characteristics presented in the previous section, we
encounter a serious non-normality problem in terms of the distribution of share
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ownership. That is easily confirmed by standard tests of normality. For our main variable
of interest, the share of foreign capital in equity, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (with
Lilliefors significance correction) detects divergence from normality, which is highly
significant at the 0.001 level.
This non-normality problem prevents us from using the OLS regressions as an
estimation method. Therefore, we used two alternative methods of estimations: logistic
regression and ordinal regression.
/1/ Logistic regression. 
Logistic regression fits our analysis, as it is used when an outcome variable is a
dichotomous or categorical variable, which Greene (2000) refers to as a “qualitative
response” model (p811). Logistic regression involves predicting the probability of the
outcome variable, given known values of the explanatory variables. As a result the
logistic regression equation takes the form, which we will subsequently estimate:
P(Y) =
1
1 e z
 where z =     0 1 1 2 2   X X Xn n i
The parameters are estimated using the maximum likelihood method.
A useful statistic, for which significance levels are reported in Table A1, is the Wald
statistic, this has a chi square distribution and informs us if the beta coefficient for an
independent variable is significantly different from zero.
In order to analyse the usefulness of the model we can also refer to the results tables,
which show how many cases are correctly classified (labelled “overall accuracy
classification” in Table A1 below).
Here, we defined five categorical variables, to be used in subsequent estimations:
For00du: this indicator corresponds to the companies with (non-zero) presence of
foreign investors amongst equity holders.
For50du: indicates companies with majority holdings by foreign investors.
For100du: indicates companies with 100% foreign ownership.
Hen00du: relates to companies with presence of Hungarian corporations.
Hen50du: indicates companies with majority holdings by Hungarian corporations.
We did not test for 100% ownership by Hungarian corporations, as the number of such
companies is too small for the results to be meaningful.
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The chosen levels for the categorical variables are not accidental. They reflect levels,
which are important from the point of view of corporate control. 50% ownership
represent a controlling shareholding, and 100% ownership level exclude any minority
shareholders. We used 50% ownership as a cut off point since this provides an
approximation of a controlling stake of a particular group of shareholders (see Filatotchev
et al., 2001a, for a discussion of this issue). This is a very crude proxy for a full control,
and at the highly developed capital markets much lower stake can provide a voting
majority when the remaining share ownership is widely dispersed (for example, the UK
Listing Authority requires firms to disclose all ownership stakes that are larger than 3%
because of potential control issues). However, our data did not allow us to desegregate
share ownership at individual level, and, therefore, we used share ownership of particular
groups of shareholders instead. Interestingly, we also tried 75% and 90%, the two levels
which according to Hungarian law, give additional rights to dominant owners, such as
excluding minority shareholders from the automatic right to be represented on the board
and from access to all financial information on demand. Both proved to be significant, but
the results were weaker as compared with those listed above.
/2/ Ordinal regression. 
Available software (SPSS version 10.0) also allowed us to use ordinal regression, which
is a similar process to the logistic regression procedure described above, however in this
case we have more than two outcome variables (defined below).6 
The design of the ordinal regression is based on the methodology of McCullagh (1980)
and allows to model the dependence of a polytomous ordinal response on a set of
predictors (independent variables). The model makes the assumption that the response is
numerical and that the alternative outcomes are ordered.
To assess the usefulness of the model a variety of measures are used such as the
McFadden’s R squared and Nagelkerke’s R squared.
Here, we used the same thresholds, as defined above (plus one additional threshold for
foreign investors, at ownership level equal to 90%), to create five ordinal groups for
foreign ownership (For):
For = 0
                                                          
6 An alternative methodology would be to use the multinomial logit, yet this would fail to account for the
ordinal nature of the outcome or dependent model (Greene, 2000, p. 875). Yet the particular problem with
the alternative approach was that annual variation in dependent ownership variable is low.
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0 < For  < 50%,
50%  For < 90%,
90%  For < 100%,
For = 100%
Similarly, we defined three ordinal groups for the domestic corporations:
Hen = 0,
0 < Hen < 50%,
50%  Hen
As will be demonstrated, the results of the two methods are similar. However, we
believe that separate logistic regressions are important, as the second method (joint
ordinal regression) masks important non-linearities in the impact of some independent
variables, size in particular.
Selected independent variables correspond to the hypotheses formulated above.
Following a design used by Demsetz and Villanonga (2001) we use averages of past
values (in our case averages for 1994-1998) as we assume that investors rely on past
information in their decisions concerning equity levels.7
We use a standard measure of the company size, which is:8
LOGASTav = logarithm of total assets
The significance of export is measured by export intensity, defined as:
XINTav = export revenue / total revenue from sales
In addition to the above, we introduce two performance measurements.
First, we used a financial performance indicator specified as:
ATPASTav = return on assets = after tax profit / total assets9 
Taking into account possible inaccuracies in the measurement of assets, we also include
another indicator of performance, which we expect to be more important as a potential
indicator of the long-term net present value. The variable is a proxy of (average) labour
productivity, defined as:
                                                          
7 We also experimented with alternative approach, pooling all observations, and using independent
variables lagged by one year, with fixed year effects, omitting the first year in addition to one year lost due
to use of lagged independent variables. The results are similar to those obtained from our chosen
specification, and they are available on request from the authors.
8 See for instance Dhawan 2001.
9 We also experimented with returns on sales. No results were affected. Both are correlated (see below) and
we use the one, which is more standard in literature, for our specifications. Results with alternative
specifications are available on request.
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LOGPRav = LOGSALav - LOGEMPav = LOG (Sales/Employment)
In addition, we introduced a set of control variables.
First is a share of sales of given company in its sector’s total sales (SECSALav). To
calculate this variable, we combined our data with the data set for sectoral sales in
Hungary, developed by WIIW Institute in Vienna (for 1994-1998).
The second variable is a dummy for greenfield foreign investment (BVG). By introducing
this variable, we want to verify if the difference between greenfield and brownfield
investment mode had a systematic impact on the levels of equity chosen by dominant
foreign owners.
Possible owner-specific effects that attract foreign investors may also be related to the
sectoral characteristics. We capture those by sectoral dummies, as specified below, where
figures relate to corresponding NACE codes.
Two traditional / low tech sectors:
15 = food products (Food)
16,17,19, = other traditional, including textile (Text)
Three resource / scale intensive sectors:
20, 21 = wood and paper products (Woodpap)
23-25 = petroleum, chemicals, plastic (Chem)
26-28 = minerals and metals (Met)
Two high technology sectors:
29-32 = machinery (Mach)
34 = automotive (Auto)
And a residual category, omitted in estimations to avoid perfect muliticollinearity:
22, 36, 37 = other.
The primary reason for clustering NACE groups into more aggregate categories was to
avoid variables with a low number of observations.
We also experimented with another aggregated classification of sectors, related to the
distinction between ‘high tech’, ‘resource and scale intensive’ and ‘traditional’ sectors
(Mickiewicz et al. 2001; Landesmann 2000). All other variables were robust to change in
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specification, however the aggregate sectoral dummies were insignificant, so we do not
report those specifications. Even if negative, the result is interesting. It highlights that
there is no sufficient evidence to indicate that the levels of equity shares held by
foreigners are in ‘high technology’ sectors, as could be derived from some strands in
literature, as discussed in section 2.
One additional problem we encountered with the data relates to the presence of missing
values. By using Little’s multivariate test of MCAR (Chi square = 372.48, p<0.000) we
can reject the hypothesis that the data is missing in a completely random pattern. This
suggests that techniques such as the EM algorithm are appropriate, as opposed to case
wise deletion. Therefore, all subsequent estimations are based on the data set produced by
the EM technique.
Before the final choice of the model, we also checked for multicollinearity effects, using a
pearson correlation matrix (detailed results available on request). Focusing on the most
significant correlations (0.001 level), we identifed three clusters:
First, size variables (assets, sales and employment) are highly correlated. That justifies
our decision to  choose assets as the most standard single measure of size.
Second, the two financial measures (return on sales and return on assets) are highly
correlated. We choose the second one for estimation, as it seems to be more standard.
Third, predictably, employment and sales are strongly correlated with our proxy for
labour productivity, which is derived as a ratio of the two. Again, that provides an
additional argument for excluding employment and sales, as we have no specific
hypotheses related to these two.
6. Estimation results
In Annex 1, we present the results of five specifications for individual logistic regressions
related to the chosen threshold levels and two joint ordinal regressions, for both foreign
investors and domestic investors.
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The first three logistic regressions relate to the determinants of foreign investors
presence,10 majority share (i.e. above 50%) and 100% ownership, correspondingly. The
next two models present estimation for presence and majority share of Hungarian
domestic corporations. Finally, models six and seven present two ordinal regressions, for
foreign share in equity and for domestic corporations’ share in equity, correspondingly.
The ordinal regressions combine several levels of ownership together as ordinal variable,
taking into account only the levels, which has specific economic meaning, as discussed
above (i.e. zero, 50%, 90%, 100%).
Both methods of estimation yield similar results, except where a variable changes sign for
different levels of equity (that relates to size variable in particular). Unlike joint ordinal
regressions, individual regressions for different level are capable to detect those
differentiated effects.
Several results emerge from the estimations.
First, the size of the company (as measured by assets) seems to have a positive impact on
the decision of foreign owners to enter (the corresponding variable is marginally
insignificant, see Table A1). On the other hand, the same variable becomes clearly
significant with the opposite sign, for determinants of 100% foreign ownership (Table
A1). Of those two, the second (negative) effect seems to be relatively stronger. This is
reflected by the negative and statistically significant sign for joint ordinal regression
(Table A2).
It is interesting to notice that for Hungarian corporate investors, the size of company is
also a highly significant factor associated with their presence. On the other hand, its
impact becomes inconclusive at the 50% level. We could not test for 100% in this case,
as there were too few companies with this type of ownership structure. The joint test of
ordinal regression results in insignificant coefficient (Table A3).
Thus, we find strong supporting evidence for hypothesis IIa (positive impact of size,
attracting both foreign investors and Hungarian corporations) and some support for Ib
(size having negative impact on high levels of equity).
Second, we expected that export-intensity might be either an indicator of the firm’s
higher visibility (lower informational barriers) or an indicator of export-orientation and
                                                          
10 In this specification, we did not include the dummy for greenfield investment. Here, the variable is
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presence in foreign markets, where foreign investors have owner-specific advantages. In
other words, foreign investors may be attracted by companies characterised by significant
export-intensity. Our interpretation of this relates to the necessity to protect the transfer of
the owner-specific knowledge and to secure ownership against possible competition from
exports, given that transaction costs are high. On the other hand, it is clear that domestic
corporations specialise in companies which are more oriented toward  the domestic
market. In all four models relating to foreign investors (Tables A1 and A2), the
corresponding coefficients for export intensity are consistently significant with expected
signs (positive). It is also interesting to notice, that the higher levels of significance relate
not to the presence, but to the cases of 50% and 100% equity levels by foreign investors
(comp. Table A1, coefficients for XINTAV). It is clear that the issue of control is
important in case of exporting companies. 
On the other hand, Hungarian corporations tend to be attracted to companies with lower
export intensity, but in this case the link is weaker and all corresponding coefficients are
marginally insignificant (Tables A1 and A2).
Thirdly, the variable representing financial indicators is consistently highly insignificant.
It appears that in this economic environment, current financial indicators alone are not
providing decisive information on the net present value of the companies and therefore
they do not affect investment decisions by foreign investors.
On the other hand, past values of labour productivity seem to be a good indicator of
performance, which is positively associated with higher levels of FDI. In all models,
coefficients are highly significant, again with expected signs (positive for foreign
investors). It is also interesting to notice, that the highest significance level relates to
100% ownership by foreign owners, indicating that they aim for exclusion of any outside
ownership in companies characterised by highest levels of past performance.
As a mirror image of the results for foreign investors, the higher past values of labour
productivity have negative impact on both presence and majority share in ownership by
domestic corporations (Tables A1, A3). Yet, we should be careful when interpreting this
particular outcome. It may be simply indicative of the more general problem faced by any
comparative research on ownership variables and demonstrate the limitations of partial
equilibrium analysis. Namely, the choices and actions by different classes by owners are
                                                                                                                                                                            
spurious, as by definition it is perfectly correlated with the presence of foreign owners.
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never independent from each other. In the particular context of an open transition
economy, with relatively fast privatisation process, the investors face disequilibrium
situation, with under-priced equity. Additionally, being not restricted in terms of access to
financial capital, foreign investors have clear advantage over domestic investors,. That
relates in particular to the early stage of the privatisation process. Given that handicap, the
foreign owners may have a first mover advantage, choosing the preferred companies.
Thus, the capital market situation could be described by a specific bidding model, with
foreign owners acting first due to their access to financial capital. This interpretation is
particularly relevant for the group of companies we analyse that is the largest Hungarian
manufacturing firms. If this interpretation is correct, the results for the Hungarian
domestic corporations are affected by the choices made by foreign investors and should
be treated with caution.
Fourthly, none of the models can identify any significant difference between greenfield
and brownfield foreign investment projects. The mode of entry has no visible impact on
the chosen levels of foreign ownership.
And finally, strategic focus on companies with a strong position on the domestic market
has impact neither on presence nor on higher control levels by the two classes of investors
we discuss. This can be explained as a corollary of the result related to export intensity.
Significance of the second fact explains why the position of the company on the domestic
market is not important.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
Our study examines corporate governance and ownership dynamics in a transition
economy. The paper helps to fill gaps in relation to longitudinal studies, multi-industry
samples and large newly-privatized manufacturing firms. It is also novel in the
internationalisation literature context, with its focus on local firms, rather than on foreign
firms’ internationalization. Although we focus specifically on Hungary, variation in
governance regimes (La Porta et al., 1997) suggests scope for international analyses of the
links between governance, firm-level characteristics and exporting. 
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Our analysis demonstrates that the ownership structure of Hungarian firms is moving
towards a higher degree of homogeneity and concentration. Institutional investors, both
foreign and domestic, are emerging as two dominant classes of owners.
Moreover, the econometric results are consistent with assumption that the equity levels
are endogenous. Our estimations of equity shares held by both foreign investors and
domestic corporations are consistent with the literature reviewed in the theory section of
the paper that suggests that ownership structure may be an equilibrium response to firm’s
operating characteristics and external environment.
This study also confirms some recent developments in the international business research
that suggest that equity investment by foreign firms in transition economies may be
driven by a number of strategic factors. In particular, the informational asymmetry may be
a barrier to foreign investment and this is why larger companies are chosen by foreign
investors, that is, those with more and superior quality information available. A similar
argument relates to export-intensive companies, albeit this second result may also be
interpreted in terms of the effort of foreign investors to protect the knowledge transfer,
assuming that foreign investors wish to prevent their joint venture from becoming a
competitor to them in the international market.
In addition, the foreign investors are both entering and building up high controlling stakes
of companies characterised by high labour productivity. On the other hand, past financial
results are not important. This is consistent with the literature on transition economies,
which argues that financial indicators might be misleading, therefore labour productivity
is a better proxy for expected future performance in such an environment (see Bornstein
2000 for an overview). Again, the fact that foreign investors are attracted to the
companies characterised by previous positive results in terms of performance, can be
explained by presence of informational asymmetry: foreign investors have to rely on
available past information.
However, the novelty of our approach may lie elsewhere. In our empirical section, we
focused on three important threshold levels of equity holdings: greater than zero,
majority, and 100%. We demonstrate that the logic of equity investment decisions, i.e.
relevant factors, are different for each threshold. One particularly interesting finding
relates to the fact that while size is a factor attracting presence of foreign owners, it makes
acquiring 100% stakes difficult. We obtained similar result for Hungarian corporations,
as size becomes insignificant, once we consider a higher equity level.
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There is a number of limitations in our research that helps to map out some possible
avenues of future analysis. This study experienced problems in obtaining representative
samples, accurate data and longitudinal information that are common in transitional and
emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Further studies using different samples of
enterprises would help with validation and may provide greater understanding of the
dynamics of the corporate control evolutions. Measuring outcomes may be premature and
definitive conclusions concerning the link between ownership structure, exporting and
performance may need to await further progress with transition. This study is focused on
largest firms, and further research might compare (medium and small size) de novo and
smaller privatized firms as well as examining how strategies and entry modes of investors
differ from developed market contexts. Improvements in data quality and larger samples
may facilitate full structural equation modeling of the complex inter-relationships
between ownership structure, performance and internationalisation (exporting in
particular). Finally, our analysis is focused on the aggregated groups of shareholders, and
the corporate governance effects of identities of particular shareholders may be another
important direction of the future research (Filatotchev, Mickiewicz 2001).
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Annex 1: Estimation results
Table A1: Bivariate logistic regressions
Dependent variable: presence of foreign investors (foreign share in equity > 0)
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent
variable
FOR>0 FOR>50% FOR=100% HEN>0 HEN>50%
Independent variables:
ATPASTAV -.452
(2.507)
-.388
(2.146)
-1.753
(1.869)
2.466
(1.825)
-.002
(2.322)
XINTAV 2.164**
(1.057)
2.018**
(.877)
1.862**
(.809)
-1.268*
(.773)
-1.866*
(.977)
LOGASTAV .554
(.348)
.118
(.257)
-.617***
(.240)
.629***
(.229)
-.056
(.285)
LOGPRAV .828**
(.409)
.933***
(.354)
.933***
(.301)
-.866***
(.296)
-.995**
(.406)
SECSALAV .002
(.007)
.003
(.011)
-.001
(.003)
.002
(.003)
-.004
(.022)
FOOD -1.850
(1.220)
-1.421
(1.377)
-.747
(1.079)
-.115
(.813)
.393
(.842)
TEXT 5.278
(24.55)
5.489
(14.958)
2.081
(1.521)
-2.589*
(1.350)
-7.223
(24.585)
WOODPAP -1.440
(1.628)
-.533
(1.591)
1.589
(1.289)
-2.685**
(1.343)
-.465
(1.367)
CHEM -.688
(1.304)
-1.131
(1.269)
-.167
(1.055)
-.710
(.851)
-.493
(.938)
MET -2.249*
(1.277)
-1.798
(1.308)
.204
(1.121)
-1.260
(.881)
-.295
(.961)
MACH -1.614
(1.525)
1.854
(1.387)
1.845
(1.376)
-1.509
(.991)
-.971
(1.208)
AUTO -1.410
(1.741)
1.034
(1.558)
.211
(1.445)
-.621
(1.107)
.590
(1.274)
BVG .487
(.614)
.184
(.528)
-.419
(.525)
-.255
(.664)
Constant -4.388
(2.929)
-2.425
(2.413)
.358
(1.977)
-.739
(1.782)
3.167
(2.381)
Omnibus
Tests of
Model
Coefficients
(Chi-square)
25.4 36.6 43.5 41.0 28.2
Significance 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008
Overall
accuracy of
classification 80.2% 73.9% 70.8% 72.7% 77.6%
S.E. in parantheses.
* significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level
(Wald).
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Table A6: Ordinal regression. Dependent variable: share of foreign investors in
equity (groups: FOR=0, 0<FOR<50%, 50%<FOR<90%, 90%<FOR<100%)
Variables Estimate Std. Error Wald Sig.
ATPASTAV -1.150 1.547 .553 .457
XINTAV 1.539 .656 5.499 .019
LOGASTAV -.391 .182 4.629 .031
LOGPRAV .816 .246 11.055 .001
SECSALAV 4.526E-04 .001 .176 .675
[TRAD=.00] -9.322E-02 .904 .011 .918
[HT=.00] 1.226 1.162 1.112 .292
[FOOD=.00] .414 .900 .212 .645
[TEXT=.00] -2.464 1.434 2.951 .086
[WOODPAP=.00] -1.865 1.158 2.596 .107
[CHEM=.00] .158 .848 .035 .852
[MET=.00] -5.507E-03 .895 .000 .995
[MACH=.00] -1.721 1.019 2.854 .091
[AUTO=.00] -.514 1.087 .223 .636
Model Fitting Information: Chi-Square 42.9, df 14, significance: 0.000. Link function: logit.
Pseudo R-Square: Cox and Snell 0.233, Nagelkerke 0.251, McFadden 0.101.
Table A7: Ordinal regression. Dependent variable: equity share of Hungarian
institution. investors. (ordinal variable; groups: HEN=0, 0<HEN<50%, 50%<HEN)
Variables Estimate Std. Error Wald Sig.
ATPASTAV .722 1.679 .185 .667
XINTAV -1.029 .722 2.027 .155
LOGASTAV .166 .197 .712 .399
LOGPRAV -1.035 .284 13.283 .000
SECSALAV -1.343E-02 .028 .232 .630
[TRAD=.00] .164 .997 .027 .869
[HT=.00] .249 1.243 .040 .841
[FOOD=.00] -1.058 .964 1.207 .272
[TEXT=.00] 1.352 1.460 .857 .355
[WOODPAP=.00] .555 1.216 .208 .648
[CHEM=.00] -.169 .974 .030 .863
[MET=.00] .188 1.019 .034 .854
[MACH=.00] .187 1.070 .031 .861
[AUTO=.00] -1.502 1.138 1.742 .187
Model Fitting Information: Chi-Square 37.5, df 14, significance: 0.001. Link function: logit.
Pseudo R-Square: Cox and Snell 0.207, Nagelkerke 0.239, McFadden 0.115.
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Annex 2: Figures
Figure 1. The evolution of share of foreign equity in Hungarian firms, 1994-1999
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Share in total capital
Unweighted average
29
Figure 2. The evolution of share of insiders in Hungarian firms, 1994-1999
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
1.6%
1.8%
2.0%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Share in total capital
Unweighted average
30
31
Figure 4. The evolution of share of state equity in Hungarian firms, 1994-1999
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Figure 5. Distribution of Foreign Capital Share in Equity, 1994 and 1999
Figure 6. Distribution of Hungarian Enterprises  Share in Equity, 1994 and 1999
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Figure 7
Scatter Diagram:
Share of Foreign Capital
in Equity, 1994 and 1999
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Figure 8
Scatter Diagram:
Share of Hungarian
Institutional Investors
in Equity, 1994-1999
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